T h e N e t h e r l a n d s i s a small c o u n t r y , approximately t h e size o f M a r y l a n d a n d Delaware combined.
Yet, it has much i n d u s t r y and, w i t h a population o f some 1 4 million people, i t has one of t h e h i g h e s t population densities in t h e w o r l d .
Criss-crossed w i t h thousands o f miles o f waterways o f a l l sizes, it i s also a c o u n t r y rich in s u r f a c e waters.
B y 1970, t h e y e a r t h e Pollution o f S u r f a c e Waters A c t w e n t i n t o effect, i n d u s t r y a n d p r i v a t e households were p r o d u c i n g r o u g h l y 45 millions o f p o p u l a t i o n equivalents' o f o x y g e nconsuming o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n .
As a r e s u l t , o v e r a l l w a t e r q u a l i t y in t h e c o u n t r y had, in p l a i n terms, become r o t t e n --b o t h f i g u r a t i v e l y a n d l i t e r a l l y ! B u t by 1980, o r g a n i c p o l l u
t i o n caused by i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n h a d declined by t w o -t h i r d s .
Almost h a l f o f t h e remaining o r g a n i c pollution, from b o t h i n d u s t r y a n d households, was removed in sewage treatment plants, many o f w h i c h h a d been n e w l y built.
E v e r y w h e r e biologically "dead" waters r ev i v e d .
In Hoogerwerf, 1985) .
light o f t h e r e s u l t s achieved, water q u a l i t y p o l i c y is r e g a r d e d in T h e N e t h e r l a n d s as one o f t h e few examples o f e f f e c t i v e governmental i n t e rv e n t i o n (

Government i n t e r v e n t i o n can t a k e many forms a n d in t h e case o f D u t c h water q u a l i t y p o l i c y many d i f f e r e n t i n s t r u m e n t s a r e i n v o l v e d . P r o d u c t i o n o f
collective goods by t h e state ( t h e treatment o f sewage in p l a n t s owned by local water b o a r d s ) has been a major component o f t h i s policy.
In t h i s article, however, I want t o focus o n those aspects o f t h e p o l i c y t h a t deal w i t h t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l water p o l l u t i o n . T h i s r e g u l a t i o n w o r k s w i t h a mix o f d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y instruments, i n c l u d i n g n o t o n l y i n s t r u m e n t s o f d i r e c t r e g u l a t i o n but also t h e much-disputed i n s t r u m e n t o f i n d i r e c t regulation, t h e e f f l u e n t charge.
As f a r as t h e level o f charges levied, t h e D u t c h system o f e f f l u e n t charges is t h e most substantial in t h e w o r l d (Johnson E Brown, 1976) .
T h e use o f e f f l u e n t c h a r g e s as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f r e g u l a t o r y p o l i c y has been t h e object o f much dispute, as much in T h e Netherlands (Bressers, 1985) as in t h e U n i t e d States (some i n t e r e s t i n g examples f r o m t h e high p o i n t o f t h i s discussion in t h e USA a r e : White, 1976; Majone, 1976; RoseAckerman, 1977; McSpadden-Wenner, 1978) . T h e c o n t r o v e r s y between advocates a n d opponents o f r e p l a c i n g d i r e c t i v e s by i n c e n t i v e strategies in v a r i o u s f i e l d s o f p u b l i c i n t e r v e n t i o n has always been r a t h e r heated, t h o u g h c a r r i e d o n more in terms o f t h e o r y t h a n empirical evidence d r a w n from experience w i t h charges in actual operation (cf. Mitnick, 1980, pp. 373-383) . Much l i k e p e r m i t t r a d i n g , a n i n c e n t i v e approach a c t u a l l y u s e d in t h e U n i t e d States, r e g u l a t o r y e f f l u e n t c h a r g e s in T h e N e t h e r l a n d s more o r tess "sneaked in t h r o u g h t h e b a c k door" (Oates, 1983) .
T h e D u t c h system o f It is also one o f t h e oldest systems in operation.
The author is grateful to D r . Kenneth IIanf for his valuable help with the translation of this article, 500 water q u a l i t y charges h a d o r i g i n a l l y been designed t o fulfill a revenue raising function. Indeed, until t h e publication (Bressers, 1983) o f t h e results o f t h e research o n t h e actual operation o f t h i s system o f charges reported o n in t h i s article, many environmental organizations, political parties a n d students o f environmental policy (especially lawyers), doubted whether these e f f l u e n t charges had any r e g u l a t o r y effect a t all. 2
A BRIEF SURVEY OF DUTCH WATER Q U A L I T Y POLICY
In a n effort t o combat pollution at t h e source, t h e 1970 Pollution o f Surface Waters A c t p r o h i b i t s all nonlicensed discharges i n t o surface waters. I n d i r e c t polluters, those d i s c h a r g i n g i n t o a sewage collector, must meet t h e conditions imposed by municipalities f o r those hooked up t o t h e collection system.
In turn, t h e municipalities a r e often subject t o conditions from t h e water authorities r e g a r d i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e sewage t h a t they discharge into t h e treatment p l a n t s o f t h e water boards.
In t h e Netherlands, t h e water boards own a n d operate t h e treatment plants. In t h e past decade, an enormous e f f o r t was made t o expand e f f l u e n t treatment capacity, w i t h t h e result t h a t t h e amount o f organic pollution removed from sewages discharges increased t o 25 percent in 1975 a n d t o 46 percent in 1980.
T h i s removal rate put T h e Netherlands more o r less o n p a r w i t h i t s neighboring countries.
T h e "polluter pays" p r i n c i p l e is t h e basis f o r t h e e f f l u e n t charges o f t h e Pollution o f Surface Waters Act.
Officially, t h e sole purpose o f these charges is t o raise t h e money needed t o finance sewage treatment measures. In view of t h e ambitious p r o g r a m f o r expanding treatment capacity, these charges involve large amounts o f money.
In 1971, they generated revenues o f about $30 million; in 1975 approximately $200 million; in 1980 almost $450 million; a n d in 1985, $550 million.
In T h e Netherlands each f i r m has t o p a y a fee r o u g h l y according t o t h e amount o f pollution it produces.
T h e amount o f pollution i s calculated in pollution u n i t s called "population equivalents."
A population equivalent i s defined as being equivalent t o t h e amount o f organic pollution in wastewater normally produced by one person.
T h e fee p e r pollution unit rose s h a r p l y during t h e p e r i o d t h e charge system has been in effect (moving from about $ 6 / u n i t t o about $ 3 0 / u n i t ) . T h e fee charged varies according t o t h e region w i t h i n w h i c h t h e f i r m i s located. These regional differences a r e not, however, based o n d i f f e r e n t environmental conditions o r q u a l i t y objectives but r a t h e r reflect regionally d i f f e r e n t costs o f building a n d operating treatment plants.
T h e u n i q u e features o f T h e Netherlands system make it an i n t e r e s t i n g example o f t h e use o f charges.
T h e D u t c h system o f e f f l u e n t charges has been in operation since 1970 and, in terms o f t h e level o f t h e charges, i s more t h a n twice as large as t h e comparable German program ( B r o w n E Johnson, 1983) . B u t t h e most d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature o f t h e D u t c h system i s that i t s use as a r e g u l a t o r y instrument has been "accidental.*' It was not intended t o w o r k in t h i s way.
Originally, t h e charges were t o b e used t o finance t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d operation o f sewage treatment plants.
In t h i s sense, t h e y did n o t replace t h e official i n t e r v e n t i o n strategy o f d i r e c t regulation.
Given t h i s situation, t h e D u t c h case provides a unique opportunity t o examine t h e effects o f these two approaches as they were applied t o t h e same case.
It also was possible t o collect f o r t h e period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] data on indus rial pollution b y t y p e of pollution, branch of i n d u s t r y and water d i s t r i c t . In addition, it was possible to collect information on t h e d e g r e e to which different water authorities employed various t y p e s of policy instruments. On t h e basis of t h e s e d a t a , it was possible to draw inferences regarding t h e relative effectiveness of effluent c h a r g e s and direct regulation based on a number of different statistical analyses.
In t h e following section, t h e d e g r e e o f effectiveness, o u r dependent variable, will b e defined.
In section t h r e e , w e will then look a t t h r e e statistical analyses of t h e impact o f t h e policy instruments used. These analyses a r e supplemented in section four b y two e x p e r t assessments of t h e s e impacts. T h e final section p r e s e n t s some general conclusions regarding t h e Dutch experience with effluent charges.
'
Goal Attainment a n d Effectiveness: What h a s been accomplished?
T h e f i r s t question to b e answered empirically r e g a r d s t r e n d s in Dutch industrial water pollution d u r i n g t h e period u n d e r investigation. These t r e n d s a r e examined in relation to t h e two most important t y p e s of industrial water pollution : oxygen-consuming organic pollution measured in PEs (so-called population equivalents) and heavy metal pollution.
In 1975, t h e y e a r in which t h e f i r s t Multi-Year Indicative Program on water pollution control was issued, Dutch i n d u s t r y still produced a staggering 19,670,000 population equivalents (PE) of oxygen-consuming organic pollution. T h i s was substantially more than t h e pollution produced b y all Dutch households together. By 1980, t h e e n d of t h e period covered by t h e program, t h e total amount of industrially produced organic pollution had dropped to 14,331,000 PE. T h i s represented a reduction of more than five million PE, o r 27 percent. A decrease of roughly t h i s magnitude had been projected by t h e 1975 policy program.
T h e r e were, however, enormous regional differences. In some a r e a s (water board districts) organic industrial pollution had actually increased, whereas in o t h e r a r e a s t h i s t y p e of pollution had been reduced b y more than one-half.
T h e 1975 program had set no explicit t a r g e t s regarding t h e abatement of industrial water pollution with heavy metals. As was t h e c a s e with organic pollution, t h e r e have also been h u g e regional differences in t h e amount of reduction attained in heavy metal pollution. In general, however, it can be concluded t h a t industrial pollution with heavy metals has, on t h e whole, been reduced b y approximately one-half in t h e period involved.
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS I : MULTIPLE TIME SERIES
Without f u r t h e r analysis it is not clear whether these decreases in industrial wastewater pollution a r e in fact t h e results of t h e water quality policy p u r s u e d by t h e government.
A s is often t h e case in evaluating policy, it also was not possible in t h i s case to employ a t r u l y experimental research design in examining this question.
For t h i s reason, a number of o t h e r methods have been combined to determine t h e e x t e n t to which levels of pollution reduction attained can b e a t t r i b u t e d to t h e policy measures taken.
W e f i r s t carried o u t a time-series analysis of t h e t r e n d s in industrial wastewater containing biodegradable organic substances.
Until 1970, t h e y e a r in which t h e water quality law went into effect, organic industrial pollution increased.
Thereafter t h e r e was a s h a r p , continuous decline. (see Figure 1 . ) However, even s u c h evidence of a striking decline does In t h i s connection, t h e r e l e v a n t decisions a r e r e g a r d i n g : It is, however, b e t t e r t o b e cautious in t h i s r e g a r d a n d t o a t t r i b u t e a n y change in t h e level o f p r o d u c t i o n n o t t o water q u a l i t y p o l i c y but instead t o such f a c t o r s as economic recession, making p r o d u c t i o n decline a n a l t e r n a t i v e explanation f o r t h e p o l l u t i o n decline observed.
F i g u r e 1 shows that, in fact, t h e volume o f p r o d u c t i o n did n o t decline, n o t e v e n in t h e recessionary p e r i o d o f 1975-1980. A t t h e same time, w i t h more o r less p o l l u t i o n ) .
however, t h e r e was a dramatic decrease in pollution between 1970 a n d 1975, a time when t h e economy was booming. I f we look at t h e separate branches o f i n d u s t r y , in o r d e r t o make s u r e t h a t t h i s overall decrease in pollution i s n o t the r e s u l t o f a decline in p r o d u c t i o n in some o f t h e heavily p o l l u t i n g industries, we find t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y a few i n d u s t r i e s t h a t have experienced a decrease in production. Even i f we assume t h a t a n y decrease in p o l l u t i o n leads d i r e c t l y t o a proportionate reduction in pollution ( a n o v e r l yoptimistic assumption! ) , t h e p r o d u c t i o n decreases i n these i n d u s t r i e s would r e s u l t in a decrease in total oxygen-consuming i n d u s t r i a l pollution o f o n l y 2 t o 3 p e r c e n t as compared w i t h t h e actually recorded o v e r a l l decline o f 27 percent.
A similar situation can b e found w i t h r e g a r d t o pollution w i t h heavy metals.
Given t h e fact t h a t p r o d u c t i o n has, o n t h e whole, tended t o increase instead o f decline, we can conclude t h a t pollution p e r p r o d u c t unit has decreased more sharply t h a n total pollution a n d t h a t t h e level o f pollut i o n p e r p r o d u c t unit has decreased more s h a r p l y t h a n total pollution a n d t h a t t h e level o f pollution r e d u c t i o n attained tends t o underestimate t h e effectiveness o f water q u a l i t y policy.
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 2: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Theoretically, changes in pollution p e r p r o d u c t unit might v e r y well b e accounted f o r by o t h e r factors a p a r t from policy outputs.
Before we can say a n y t h i n g about t h e i r r e l a t i v e influence, we must f i r s t l i s t t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f factors t h a t may have an impact o n p e r unit pollution. We have constructed such a n i n v e n t o r y u s i n g f i v e dimensions o f decision making in t h e mode o f t h e "subjectively rational actor" (Hennipman, 1945;  cf. Simon, 1955) . F i g u r e 2 p r o v i d e s a n overview o f these dimensions a n d t h e alternat i v e explanations available t o account f o r reductions in p e r unit pollution. Below we p r e s e n t a summary of t h e conclusions reached by a p p l y i n g Michael Scriven's "modus operandi" method (Scriven, 1976) to t h e examination o f these d i f f e r e n t factors.
T h e conclusions d r a w n from t h i s analysis o f alternative explanations all p o i n t consistently in t h e same d i r e c t i o n : the factors considered cannot in themselves account f o r t h e amount o f pollution reduction attained.
T h e y will, however, t e n d t o f u r t h e r o r impede t h e impact o f water q u a l i t y policy o n t h e amount o f pollution produced.
"Environmentally f r i e n d l y " technological developments (see Ila,l' F i g u r e 2) d o n o t j u s t appear o u t o f nowhere. Since o t h e r factors have always g i v e n t h e impulse for such developments, t h e y cannot themselves b e viewed as a n independent cause o f pollution abatement levels.
However, technological development can sometimes b e indispensable f o r t h e realization o f t h e abatement t h a t companies, f o r o t h e r reasons ( s u c h as in response t o policy measures), deemed necessary.
In t h e case o f heavy metal pollution, developments w i t h respect t o t h e p r i c e of these materials cannot account f o r t h e amount o f abatement achieved since, in t h e p e r i o d u n d e r investigation, these prices declined instead o f r i s i n g (see "b," F i g u r e 2 ) .
It i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e environmental awareness of i n d u s t r i a l leaders a n d t h e population in general (see "c a n d d," F i g u r e 21 has been an independent cause of pollution abatement, among other reasons because o f t h e "logic o f collective action" (Olson, 1971) . B u t it i s conceivable t h a t t h e e x t e n t t o which a n d t h e r a t e a t which policy leads t o r e s u l t s will b e influenced by t h e level o f environmental awareness. In addition, t h e impact o f information p r o v i d e d by nongovernmental bodies regarding abatement measure (see "e," F i g u r e 2 ) should b e considered marginal (supplementing o t h e r factors).
Information i s necessary but in itself h a r d l y e v e r sufficient f o r companies t o decide t o reduce pollution. This i s so because these measures usually lead t o h i g h e r production costs.
F i g u r e 2 I n v e n t o r y of A l t e r n a t i v e E x p l a n a t i o n s o f Reductions i n P o l l u t i o n p e r Produce U n i t
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Time series analyses, supplemerited by analyses u s i n g t h e "modus operandi" method, p r o v i d e support f o r t h e conclusion t h a t t h e level o f pollution reduction achieved can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e policy p u r s u e d . T h e answer t o t h e main question o f this paper, i.e. which policy instruments have h a d the greatest effect o n the abatement o f pollution in i n d u s t r i a l wastewater, obviously depends o n determining, f i r s t of all, how important policy as such has been in bringing about a r e d u c t i o n in i n d u s t r i a l water pollution.
If t h e empirically observed decrease in pollution cannot b e accounted f o r by other factors, t h e n it would seem, logically speaking, t h a t policy measures taken must account f o r it. As t h e n e x t sections will demonstrate, t h i s has indeed been t h e case in The Netherlands.
T h e substantial reduction in i n d u s t r i a l wastewater pollution has been t h e r e s u l t o f D u t c h water q u a l i t y policy. Since t h a t policy contains a "mix" o f d i f f e r e n t measures, t h e questions remains as t o which o f t h e various instruments applied has c o n t r i b u t e d most t o t h e policy's apparent effectiveness.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 1 : A S T A T I S T I C A L ASSESSMENT
In t h e p r e v i o u s section we noted t h a t t h e r e have been substantial regional differences in t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e policy objectives have been achieved. However, these differences cannot, without f u r t h e r investigation, b e e x p l a i n e d by t h e e x t e n t
t o w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l water b o a r d s a p p l i e d t h e v a r i o u s p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s a t t h e i r disposal. F i r s t o f all, t h e water d i st r i c t s themselves v a r y g r e a t l y in size a n d t h u s in p o l l u t i o n loads.
A l o n g w i t h 17 r a t h e r l a r g e d i s t r i c t s , t h e r e were, during t h e research period, 23 o f r a t h e r small area.
In 1975, 97 p e r c e n t o f t h e total volume o f o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n was p r o d u c e d in these 17 l a r g e d i s t r i c t s .
Since t h e percentage decreases in p o l l u t i o n o f t e n reached extreme values in t h e 23 smaller areas, based, however, o n o n l y a few observations ( f i r m s ) , these areas have been e x c l u d e d from t h e analysis r e p o r t e d below.
T h e impact o f developments in these d i s t r i c t s o n t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e analysis would h a v e been o u t o f p r op o r t i o n t o t h e i r a c t u a l importance.
D i f f e r e n c e s in goal attainment among t h e remaining areas can b e accounte d f o r by t w o sets o f factors.
O n t h e one hand, t h e y can b e p a r t l y exp l a i n e d in terms o f d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e economic s t r u c t u r e o f d i f f e r e n t water d i s t r i c t s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e l a t i v e weight o f p a r t i c u l a r b r a n c h e s o f indust r y .
In t h e case o f h e a v y metal pollution, d i f f e r e n c e s in abatement levels may b e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e r e l a t i v e share o f v a r i o u s metals in t h e total volume o f p o l l u t i o n .
U s i n g data o n t h e share o f d i f f e r e n t b r a n c h e s o f i n d u s t r y in t h e regional economy and, f o r h e a v y metals, t h e share o f v a r i o u s substances in t h e regional p o l l u t i o n in 1975, a n d o n t h e average decrease in p o l l u t i o n p e r i n d u s t r y a n d substance in T h e Netherlands between 1975 a n d
1980, t h e amount o f p o l l u t i o n decrease t h a t could b e expected o n t h e basi o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f regional economy was calculated f o r each water d i s t r i c t . T h i s e x p e c t e d v a l u e was closely c o r r e l a t e d to actual decrease o f pollution.
In t h e case o f o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n t h e Pearson's r was +.79 ( r Z = .62) a n d in t h e case o f h e a v y metals p o l l u t i o n it was +.74 ( r Z = .55).
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E f f l u e n t Charges a n d B r a n c h D i f f e r e n c e s in Pollution Decrease
In 7969, t h e f i r s t time o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater was measured by i n d u s t r i a l b r a n c h , it was determined t h a t f o u r t e e n i n d u s t r i e s accounted f o r 90 p e r c e n t o f t h i s p o l l u t i o n .
These f o u r t e e n i n d u s t r i e s form t h e research u n i t s in t h e analysis d e s c r i b e d below.
Since t h e y accounted f o r s u c h a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e pollution, t h i s analysis i s n o t so much a sample s t u d y but r a t h e r a semipopulation s t u d y . Nevertheless, in view o f t h e small n u m b e r o f u n i t s involved, a w o r d o f caution is in o r d e r when d r a w i n g conclusions based o n t h i s sample o f i n d u s t r i e s .
T h e r e a r e a number o f f a c t o r s t h a t could account f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e s f o u n d between these i n d u s t r i e s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p e r c e n t o f decrease in t h e i r o r g a n i c pollution.
Most obviously, decreases o r increases in t h e level o f p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s could a f f e c t t h e volume o f p o l l u t i o n p r o d u c e d in t h e p e r i o d u n d e r investigation.
A second cause o f d i f f e r e n c e s in abatement r a t e s can b e f o u n d in t h e f a c t t h a t in a p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y it i s much more difficult, a n d t h u s more expensive, to p r o d u c e more "cleanly" t h a n it is in another i n d u s t r y .
Therefore, in a d d i t i o n t o t h e increase o r decrease in production, r e l a t i v e abatement costs can p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t role in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e level o f p o l l u t i o n r e d u c t i o n achieved.
F i n a l l y a n d ( i n connection w i t h t h e focus of t h i s s t u d y ) most importantly, it i s also conceivable t h a t e f f l u e n t c h a r g e s c o u l d lead t o d i f f e r e n c e s in abatement between i n d u s t r i e s .
T h e more p o l l u t i o n u n i t s p e r unit o f p r o d u c t i o n v a l u e t h a t a r e caused by a n i n d u s t r y , t h e g r e a t e r t h e impact t h a t t h e charges will h a v e o n p r o d u c t i o n costs. T h i s can mean t h a t some i n d u s t r i e s w i l l bear c h a r g e s t h a t a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r t h a n o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s .
E f f o r t s t o reduce t h e number o f pollution u n i t s produced w i l l b e g r e a t e r t o t h e e x t e n t that a g i v e n i n d u s t r y is liable f o r h i g h e r charges compared t o i t s production value.
In t h e discussion t h a t follows t h i s factor w i l l b e r e f e r r e d to, for convenience, as t h e "charge factor ,I ' T h e e x t e n t t o which organic pollution o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater decreased between 1969 a n d 1980 appears t o b e related t o t h e t h r e e above-mentioned factors as follows: p r o d u c t i o n increase, r = -.21; abatement costs, r = .50; and charge factor, r = .73. T h e signs o f these relations a r e a l l in the anticipated direction. T h e s t r o n g correlation w i t h t h e charge factor i s v e r y s t r i k i n g .
When t h e t h r e e factors a r e related simultaneously t o pollution decrease, t h e y account statistically f o r 63 p e r c e n t o f t h e decrease.
T h e regression equation across t h e 14 major branches was estimated as: P = .33 C -.32 AC -.01 Prod, R Z = .63 where P = p e r c e n t decrease in discharge 1969-1980 C = c h a r g e factor calculated as pollution ( i n 1000 PE) liable t o charges
by total p r o d u c t i o n value in millions o f D u t c h guilders in 1969
AC =estimated average cost o f treatment p e r b r a n c h Prod = p e r c e n t change in o u t p u t during 1969-1980
The standardized c o n t r i b u t i o n (beta) o f t h e t h r e e factors i s : p r o d u c t i o n
increase, -0.30; abatement costs, -0.25; a n d charge factor, 0.61.
In t h e case o f two o f t h e fourteen industries (potato-starch i n d u s t r y a n d the stock-raising i n d u s t r y ) , charges h a d less influence t h a n was t o b e expected o n t h e basis o f t h e i r charge factor.
In anticipation o f ultimately being hooked up t o a "smeerpipe" (literally, a dirt pipe), t h e potato starch i n d u s t r y h a d been allowed t o continue w i t h u n t r e a t e d discharges.
D u r i n g this time, t h e i n d u s t r y was p a y i n g much lower charge-rates t h a n were o t h e r industries.
T h e stock-raising i n d u s t r y i s composed o f thousands o f relatively small farms.
Here t h e charges a r e seldom calculated exactly o n t h e basis o f t h e amount o f pollution actually produced.
Hence i t is t o b e expected t h a t t h e impact o f charges w i l l p r o b a b l y b e less in t h i s case t h a n in o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s w i t h a similar charge factor. When these two i n d u s t r i e s are l e f t o u t o f t h e analysis, t h e correlation o f t h e charge factor w i t h t h e decrease in p o l l u t i o n is even s t r o n g e r : r = .84. T h e correlation w i t h t h e other two factors remains about t h e same, w i t h p r o d u c t i o n increase showing a r o f -.24 a n d abatement costs a n r o f -.48. These t h r e e factors, taken together, account f o r 76 percent o f t h e differences in t h e decrease o f organic pollution in i n d u s t r i a l wastewater between these twelve industries. Policy I n s t r u m e n t s a n d Regional Differences in t h e Decrease of Organic Pollution A n important p a r t o f t h e regional variation in pollution abatement cannot b e explained by differences in t h e i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e regions.
I f t h e conclusion o f t h e above section i s correct, t h i s leftover variation can b e explained e n t i r e l y in terms o f t h e degree t o w h i c h d i f f e r e n t policy i n s t r uments a r e being used. T h e degree t o which these d i f f e r e n t instruments a r e actually used will also v a r y g r e a t l y from region t o region.
In t h i s section, we will examine t h e e x t e n t t o which t h i s explanation is accurate.
As in t h e discussion of t h e alternative explanations o f pollution decline, policy instruments can also b e g r o u p e d in terms o f factors t h a t influence
A l l i n s t r u m e n t s mentioned a r e used simultaneously in D u t c h water q u a l i t y policy.
As can b e seen in F i g u r e 3 , p r o h i b i t i o n s have n o t been l i n k e d w i t h r e d u c i n g t h e n u m b e r o f behavioral a l t e r n a t i v e s available t o t h e decision maker.
A l t h o u g h t h i s would appear t o b e t h e aim o f such directives, i t would b e u n r e a l i s t i c t o assume t h a t t h e y a r e always successful in t h i s r e g a r d .
What 
a d v i c e t o companies about p r o p e r t i e s o f o f a1 t e r n a t i v e s e x i s t i n g abatement techniques
Since we a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d in e f f l u e n t c h a r g e s a n d since, o n t h e basis o f t h e b r a n c h analysis above, we expect t o find a clear impact o f charges o n decisions a f f e c t i n g t h e amount o f pollution, we w i l l examine t h e impact o f t h i s i n s t r u m e n t f i r s t a n d t h e n look a t t h e o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t s .
T h e dependent v a r i a b l e f o r t h i s p a r t o f t h e analysis is t h e " r e l a t i v e success o f abatement ." T h i s v a r i a b l e has been calculated as t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e actual p e r c e n t o f abatement a n d t h e p e r c e n t o f abatement expected in view o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e region.
Regional v a r ia t i o n in t h e c h a r g e level cannot, however, s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y b e related t o t h i s variable.
T h e reason f o r t h i s is as follows. T h e r e l a t i v e success o f abatement has been calculated f o r t h e p e r i o d 1975-1980. P r i o r t o t h i s time, however, p o l l u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater h a d a l r e a d y declined s u b s t a n t i a l l y . O u r analysis o f i n t e r i n d u s t r y v a r i a t i o n s (see above) makes it p l a u s i b l e t o assume t h a t abatement in t h i s p e r i o d was also l a r g e l y t h e r e s u l t o f charges.
T h e 1975 amount o f p o l l u t i o n was alr e a d y more o r less in e q u i l i b r i u m w i t h t h e c h a r g e level o f t h a t time. (Bressers, 1983-2 ; Ewringmann, Kibat, Schafhausen, Fedderson, K r i c k e l , Perdelwitz, & Strauss, 1980).
F o r t h i s reason, t h e c h a r g e f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g t h e abatement o f p o l l u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater is i n d i c a t e d much b e t t e r by t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e r a t e b e f o r e 1975 a n d t h e r a t e a t t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d 1975-1980 t h a n by t h e level o f t h e c h a r g e in a n y one o f t h e p r e c e d i n g years. However, it cannot b e determined o n theoretical g r o u n d s f o r w h i c h p e r i o d t h e c h a r g e increase should b e used as independent variable. O n t h e one hand, t h e r e i s a time-lag between t h e stimulus t o abatement e f f o r t s a n d t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n a n d putting i n t o operation o f t h e r e l e v a n t c o n t r o l measures. O n t h e o t h e r hand, it is n o t implausible t o expect a c e r t a i n degree o f a n t i c i p a t i o n by t h e companies t o c h a r g e s a n d r a t e increases
It i s b e t t e r , therefore, t o decide o n empirical g r o u n d s which p e r i o d should b e considered in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r a t e increase. T h i s p e r i o d s t a r t s in t h e y e a r in w h i c h t h e r a t e o f t h e c h a r g e has t h e h i g h e s t negative c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e r e l a t i v e success o f abatement between 1975 a n d 1980.
T h e r a t e in t h a t y e a r can b e t a k e n as t h e best i n d i c a t o r f o r t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h abatement e f f o r t s b e f o r e 1975 n e g a t i v e l y affected abatement a c t i v i t i e s in t h e subsequent p e r i o d by t h e r e s u l t i n g increase o f marginal costs o f f u r t h e r abatement.
T
h e r a t e c h a r g e d in t h a t year should t h e n b e s u b t r a c t e d f r o m t h e c h a r g e a t t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d w i t h t h e h i g h e s t posit i v e c o r r e l a t i o n in o r d e r t o g e t t h e b e s t possible i n d i c a t o r o f t h e c h a r g e factor t h a t stimulated abatement o f p o l l u t i o n in t h e 1975-1980 period. As expected, t h e level o f t h e c h a r g e p r i o r a r o u n d 1975 is n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e r e l a t i v e success o f abatement o f o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater in t h e y e a r s 1975-1980. T h i s negative relationship i s s t r o n g e s t w i t h t h e 1974 c h a r g e ( r = -.53). T h e correlations g r a d u a l l y become more p o s i t i v e up t o a n d i n c l u d i n g 1980. T h e 1980 r a t e o f c h a r g e shows a clear p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h r e l a t i v e abatement success ( r = +.53).
As a n i n d i c a t o r f o r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f e f f l u e n t c h a r g e o n r e l a t i v e abatement success, we will, therefore,
t a k e t h e increase in t h e r a t e c h a r g e d in t h e p e r i o d 1974-1980. F o r t w o o f t h e 17 water d i s t r i c t s examined t h i s indicator c o u l d n o t b e calculated. T h e increase in t h e r a t e c h a r g e d in t h e p e r i o d 1974-1980 has a v e r y s t r o n g p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e r e l a t i v e abatement success f o r t h e years
between 1975 a n d 1980 ( r = +.86, n = 15, p = .OOO).
T h i s relation is n o t the r e s u l t o f one o r t w o extreme values f o r t h e u n i t s analyzed, a l t h o u g h the two water q u a l i t y d i s t r i c t s w i t h r e s p e c t i v e l y t h e most a n d t h e least relative success weaken t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e relationship somewhat. Without these t w o observations t h e c o r r e l a t i o n i s even s t r o n g e r :
r = +.92 ( n = 13, p = .OOO).
F u r t h e r analysis has showed t h a t t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n cannot b e a t t r i b u t e d t o water a u t h o r i t i e s r e a c t i n g o n abatement e f f o r s by i n d u s t r y by r a i s i n g c h a r g e r a t e s t o keep t h e same amount of revenues. W i t h s u c h high correlations between t h e c h a r g e f a c t o r a n d t h e p o l l u t i o n decrease it i s n a t u r a l t h a t t h e relationships w i t h t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e g r e a t v a r i e t y o f o t h e r p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s used a r e absent o r o n l y weak. Among all these indicators, o n l y water b o a r d p e r m i t -g i v i n g t o municipalities a n d abatement schemes show up w i t h r e l a t i v e l y s u b s t a n t i a l but s t i l l modest p o s i t i v e correlations w i t h t h e r e l a t i v e abatement success. T h e r e l a t i v e abatement success, t h e dependent variable in a l l these analyses, has been d e f i n e d as t h e percentage decrease o f oxygen-consuming p o l l u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater, c o r r e c t e d t o t a k e t h e regional s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r y i n t o account. It should, therefore, b e possible t o e x p l a i n t h e variation in t h e percentage decrease o f o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n by: (a) t h e decrease t o b e expected as a r e s u l t o f d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e regional s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r y ; ( b ) t h e increase in t h e r a t e charged; ( c ) t h e number o f municipalities w i t h a p e r m i t issued by water b o a r d s ( t h u s giving these a u t h o r i t i e s i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e o n sewage p e r m i t s issued t o i n d i v i d u a l p l a n t s ) ; ( d ) t h e weighted number o f abatement plans.
A s it t u r n s out, 96 p e r c e n t o f t h e percentage decrease o f o r g a n i c water p o l l u t i o n can b e explained, statistically, by t h e f i r s t two factors ( R 2 a f t e r c o r r e c t i o n i s .95). N i n e t y -e i g h t p e r c e n t can b e explained by a l l f o u r
B f a c t o r s t a k e n together, but t h i s i s d u e mainly t o t h e f a c t t h a t one research unit has been d r o p p e d f r o m t h e calculation. I f we t a k e t h i s smaller g r o u p o f 1 4 u n i t s , t h e t w o f i r s t -n a m e d f a c t o r s e x p l a i n 97 p e r c e n t o f t h e d i f f e rences in p o l l u t i o n decrease.
T h e r e g r e s s i o n formula u s e d t o e x p l a i n 96 p e r c e n t o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e in p o l l u t i o n decrease i s : y = 0 . 9 6~1 +1.55x2 -35.6 ( c o n s t a n t ) R Z = .96, n = 15.
(0.08) (0.20)
Where y = p e r c e n t decrease o f t h e p o l l u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater x l = p e r c e n t decrease t o b e expected o n t h e basis o f t h e regional
x2 = increase in t h e r a t e c h a r g e d 1974-1980 ( i n D u t c h g u i l d e r s ) s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r y In b r a c k e t s t h e s t a n d a r d e r r o r s . T h i s means t h a t one p e r c e n t o f actual abatement c o r r e s p o n d s t o approximately one p e r c e n t abatement t o b e expecte d o n t h e basis o f t h e regional s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r y ( w h i c h is a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e calculation i s n o t d i s t o r t e d )
a n d w i t h a n increase in r a t e o f 1.5.
Policy I n s t r u m e n t s a n d Regional D i f f e r e n c e s in Decrease in Heavy Metal P o l l u t i o n T w o water b o a r d s d o n o t impose e f f l u e n t charges o n h e a v y metal p o l l u te r s . T h e i r r e s u l t s a r e n o t much d i f f e r e n t f r o m those o f t h e o t h e r d i s t r i c t s . However, as a matter o f fact, in t h e i r negotiations w i t h i n d u s t r y , when demanding q u i t e s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n s in p o l l u t i o n level, these b o a r d s did use t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n t r o d u c i n g e f f l u e n t c h a r g e s as t h r e a t .
In t h i s sense, t h e i r effectiveness in a c h i e v i n g decreases in h e a v y metal p o l l u t i o n i s n o t t o t a l l y independent o f t h e e f f l u e n t c h a r g e system.
We will n o t i n c l u d e these d i s t r i c t s in t h e following analysis.
T h e i n d i c a t o r s f o r p o l i c y o u t p u t s used h e r e are, f o r t h e most p a r t , t h e same as those used in looking a t o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n o r t h e y have been calculated in a similar manner.
T h e i n d i c a t o r s f o r p e r m i t s issued a n d f o r technology, advice a n d informal negotiations a r e d i f f e r e n t .
h e i n d i c a t o r f o r p e r m i t s has been calculated as t h e p e r c e n t o f companies t h a t d i s c h a r g e a taxable amount o f h e a v y metals h a v i n g a p e r m i t t h a t stipulates conditions f o r these discharges in 1975, t h e p e r c e n t w i t h such p e r m i t s in 1980, a n d t h e increase in these numbers between 1975 a n d 1980. Technology development, advice a n d information negotiations a r e also indicated by t h e p r o p o rt i o n o f major d i s c h a r g e r s contacted instead o f by t h e weighted number. T h e increase o f t h e c h a r g e r a t e in t h e p e r i o d 1975-1980 is c l e a r l y r e l a t e d t o t h e r e l a t i v e success o f t h e abatement o f h e a v y metal p o l l u t i o n of indust r i a l wastewater, a l t h o u g h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s n o t as e v i d e n t as w i t h t h e
abatement o f o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n . T h e r = .65, f o r a n n = 13 a n d a p = .008.
Among t h e o t h e r i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t s used weighted number o f formal r e p o r t s by p o l l u t i o n i n s p e c t o r s a n d t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f companies w i t h w h i c h a n abatement p l a n was d r a w n up were p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e r e l a t i v e abatement success w i t h h e a v y metal p o l l u t i o n . T h e weighted n u m b e r o f i n s p e c t o r s t u r n s o u t n o t t o b e related t o abatement success. T h e same goes f o r b o t h t h e number o f i n f r i n g e m e n t s detecte d b y them (as a n i n d i c a t o r of t h e i r a c t i v i t y ) a n d t h e number o f times t h e y threatened o f f i c i a l enforcement actions. However, t h e s i t u a t i o n is d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e number o f times these i n s p e c t o r s in fact o f f i c i a l l y r e p o r t such i n f r i n g e m e n t s a n d use t h e police t o enforce compliance. T h e weighted number o f formal r e p o r t s i s p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e r e l a t i v e abatement
success ( r = .30, n = 14, n.s.).
If we t a k e t h e r a t e o f increase f o r e f f l ue n t c h a r g e s i n t o account, t h e c o r r e l a t i o n i s even s t r o n g e r ( p r = .43, n = 13, p = .082).
T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f companies w i t h w h i c h a n abatement p l a n was d r a w n up is c l e a r l y r e l a t e d t o t h e r e l a t i v e abatement success. A l t h o u g h t h i s r e l a t i o n is at f i r s t r e l a t i v e l y weak ( r = .30, n = 14, r1.s.) if we t a k e i n t o account t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e increase o f r a t e charges, t h e c o r r e l a t i o n i s s t r o n g e r ( p r = .55, n = 13, p = .031).
T h e p r o p o r t i o n o f companies w i t h w h i c h a n abatement p l a n was d r a w n up is c l e a r l y related t o t h e r e l a t i v e abatement success.
A l t h o u g h t h i s relation is a t f i r s t r e l a t i v e l y weak ( r = .30, n = 14, n.s.) i f we t a k e i n t o account the i n f l u e n c e of t h e increase o f r a t e charges, t h e c o r r e l a t i o n i s s t r o n g e r ( p r = .55, n = 13, p = .031).
T h e combination o f p o l i c y o u t p u t s t h a t accounts f o r t h e g r e a t e s t p a r t o f the v a r i a t i o n in r e l a t i v e success in a b a t i n g p o l l u t i o n by h e a v y metals includes ( a f t e r a c o r r e c t i o n f o r t h e number o f independent v a r i a b l e s ) : -t h e increase in t h e c h a r g e r a t e 1975-1980; -t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f h e a v y metal d i s c h a r g e r s w i t h a n abatement plan; -t h e weighted number o f o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s o n noncompliance.
T o g e t h e r these p o l i c y o u t p u t s e x p l a i n s t a t i s t i c a l l y 82 p e r c e n t o f t h e difference in r e l a t i v e abatement success.
These t h r e e p o l i c y o u t p u t s together w i t h t h e abatement t h a t c o u l d have been expected in view o f t h e regional s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r y a n d t h e shares o f t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s o f metal statistically account f o r 91 p e r c e n t o f t h e v a r i a t i o n in decrease in heavy metal p o l l u t i o n ( R z a f t e r c o r r e c t i o n i s .87).
T h e s t a n d a r d i z e d c o n t r i b u t i o n (beta) o f t h e d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s to t h i s a r e :
x -abatement expected ( % )
.33 x 1 -increase in r a t e c h a r g e d ( i n g u i l d e r s ) 
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.36 x2 -p r o p o r t i o n o f companies w i t h abatement p l a n (5)
4
The r e g r e s s i o n equation i t s e l f r u n s as follows: y = 0 . 7 3~ + 3 . 3 5~ t 0 . 4 2~ i 6 . 2 4~ = 78.1 R Z = 0.91, n = 14 ( I n brackets, t h e s t a n d a r d e r r o r s ) (0.301) (0.802) (0.11) (1.934 Given t h a t B o f x (charges) i s more t h a n twice as high f o r h e a v y metals as it was f o r o r g a n i c pollution, it can b e concluded t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e level o f charges compared w i t h abatement costs i s much lower f o r h e a v y metals than f o r o r g a n i c pollution.
F o r most h e a v y metals, one kilogram i s equal t o one p o p u l a t i o n e q u i v a l e n t o f o r g a n i c pollution.
In general, t h e r e l a t i v e l y low level o f charges o n h e a v y metals i s acknowledged by t h a t s t a f f o f t h e water boards.
In s p i t e o f this, t h e c h a r g e appears t o p r o v i d e t h e p r i m a r y impetus f o r p o l l u t i o n abatement also in t h e case o f h e a v y metals.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 2:
A N EXPERT ASSESSMENT T h u s f a r t h r e e independent statistical analyses have shown t h a t e f f l u e n t charges have been a q u i t e effective instrument o f D u t c h water q u a l i t y policy.
T h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f each o f t h e policy instruments applied t o t h e substantial reductions o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater pollution in T h e Netherlands can also b e determined w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e assessments by insiders.
In t h i s section we w i l l compare t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e statistical analysis w i t h t h e assessment o f e x p e r t s from b o t h t h e water boards a n d i n d u s t r y r e g a r d i n g t h e relative effectiveness o f these instruments. B o t h approaches have t h e i r s t r o n g a n d weak p o i n t s (Reichardt & Cook, 1979) .
However, should b o t h methods lead to t h e same conclusion, o u r confidence would b e increased in t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h i s conclusion.
A s was t h e case w i t h t h e statistical analysis, independent analyses based o n d i f f e r e n t sets o f data were used: o n t h e one hand, t h e opinions o f negotiators from t h e water boards and, o n t h e o t h e r hand, representatives o f t h e companies who were responsible f o r water q u a l i t y .
Assessment of Policy I n s t r u m e n t by Policy lmplementors
In a questionnaire sent t o t h e regional water boards, administrators were asked t o indicate how much influence t h e y t h o u g h t t h e various policy instruments h a d o n t h e abatement o f i n d u s t r i a l wastewater pollution. For b o t h organic pollution a n d pollution w i t h heavy metals t h e respondents could choose from f i v e answers. T h e category "Not applied" could b e checked t o indicate t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u m e n t h a d n o t been used w i t h r e g a r d t o t h a t t y p e o f pollution.
In practice, "No answer" also nearly always indicated t h e instrument in question h a d n o t been used a t all o r v e r y l i t t l e . T h i s was t h e case f o r t h e seven smaller water authorities t h a t did n o t fill in t h e questionnaire completely, adding such comments as "no experience" a n d t h e like.
Regarding heavy metals, t h e question was i r r e l e v a n t f o r seventeen smaller water boards since t h e r e were no companies in t h e i r areas k n o w n t o discharge heavy metals. Table 1 shows t h e answers g i v e n t o t h i s question.
I n general these r e s u l t s correspond w i t h those o f t h e statistical analyses, a t least as f a r as t h e main points are concerned.
Charges emerge as t h e most influential policy instrument f o r dealing w i t h organic pollution, whereas in the case o f heavy metals we see t h a t t h e respondents a t t r i b u t e d equal amounts o f influence t o a broader range o f instruments. T h e r e are, however, some small but i n t e r e s t i n g differences between t h e results o f t h e questionnaire a n d those o f t h e statistical analyses.
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e statistical analysis, charges also played t h e most import a n t role in decreasing heavy metals pollution, although t o a lesser degree t h a n was t h e case w i t h oxygen-consuming pollution.
Why was it t h a t t h e regional water q u a l i t y administrators recognized t h e importance o f charges f o r t h e abatement o f organic pollution, but n o t f o r decreasing pollution w i t h heavy metals? T h e explanation seems t o be t h a t these officials can clearly see t h a t t h e r e a r e companies t h a t a r e going t o abate organic pollution because o f charges, but h a r d l y a n y companies a r e going t o abate t h e i r heavy metal pollution solely because o f t h e e f f l u e n t charges. Discharging heavy metals i s simply too cheap.
Abatement plans a n d inspections are almost always necessary t o persuade heavy-metal polluters t o take approp r i a t e action. What these water q u a l i t y administrators d o not see (indeed, what t h e y i n d i v i d u a l l y cannot see) is t h a t t h e success o f these abatement plans is much g r e a t e r in d i s t r i c t s where charges were increased t h a n in other areas.
In b o t h cases, companies have to b e persuaded by t h e water authorities t o g e t started; in some cases, however, officials must continue t o e x e r t p r e s s u r e t o ensure t h a t t h e agreed-upon measures a r e in fact carried out.
Even when t h e y cannot in themselves motivate companies t o take abatement action, charges apparently p l a y a n important role in facilitating t h e task o f t h e water q u a l i t y administrators in g e t t i n g abatement measures implemented. T h i s conclusion opens i n t e r e s t i n g perspectives o n the possibility o f a p p l y i n g charges n o t o n l y as a n alternative for, but also as a complement t o d i r e c t regulation. Table 1 Assessment by Regional Water Oual i t y A d m i n i s t r a t o r s of t h e E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f P o l i c y Instruments Another p o i n t calling f o r attention i s t h e role played by informal negotiations.
It i s clear from t h e questionnaire t h a n water b o a r d officials attached g r e a t e r importance t o t h i s instrument t h a t we would have anticipated o n t h e basis o f t h e statistical analysis.
It appears t h a t t h i s apparent discrepancy can b e accounted for by t h e fact t h a t negotiations d o not constitute a separate instrument in addition t o other policy instruments, but rather represent a manner in which t h e total "policy mix" i s applied. In this r e g a r d t h e r e a r e two i n t e r e s t i n g aspects o f informal negotiations.
In the f i r s t place, t h e y serve as a s o r t o f "lubricant" t o o i l t h e machinery put i n t o operation by t h e o t h e r policy instruments discussed above (compare f o r Germany: Hucke, 1978; a n d f o r Great B r i t a i n : Vogel, 1983, pp. 1-2).
T h e following statement by a water b o a r d official during one o f t h e oral i n t e rviews t h a t followed t h e w r i t t e n questionnaire i s i l l u s t r a t i v e o f t h i s function: "When I'm going t o have a talk w i t h a company about t h e abatement o f t h e i r discharges, I always take my pocket calculator along.
I calculate t h e i r potential savings o n charges a n d i n v a r i a b l y g e t a n i n t e r e s t i n g conversation started. I( T h i s , p r i m a r i l y informative, f u n c t i o n o f negotiations i s especially import a n t when o t h e r circumstances a n d t h e p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s applied h a v e a n i n f l u e n c e s t r o n g enough t o make abatement seem w o r t h w h i l e t o t h e companies t o b e g i n w i t h . T h i s s i t u a t i o n w i l l t e n d t o o c c u r more o f t e n in t h e case o f o r g a n i c p o l l u t i o n t h a n w i t h h e a v y metals.
T h e implementation process w i t h r e g a r d t o o r g a n i c waste matter i s characterized by r e l a t i v e l y small d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n between a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d companies r e g a r d i n g t h e amount o f abatement aimed a t . T h i s i s d u e t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e e f f l u e n t charges, w h i c h make r e d u c t i o n s o f discharges economically a t t r a c t i v e .
Heavy metals negotiations not o n l y fulfill a n i n f o r m a t i v e function; h e r e t h e y also r e p r e s e n t s t h e way in w h i c h power i s wielded. T h i s s t r a t e g y r e f l e c t s t h e f a c t t h a t in s u c h cases t h e r e a r e o f t e n q u i t e substantial d i f f e rences o f o p i n i o n between water q u a l i t y a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d t h e companies r e g a r d i n g t h e d e s i r a b l e amount o f f u r t h e r d i s c h a r g e reduction.
In these s i t u a t i o n s t h e balance o f p o w e r i s s u c h t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y is in a p o s i t i o n t o impose i t s w i l l u p o n t h e o t h e r . It appears t h e n t h a t unless t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r i s in a p o s i t i o n t o e x e r t enough p o w e r a n d t o a p p l y a p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t vis-a-vis t h e company so t h a t h e can achieve h i s abatement goals w i t h o u t delay, it i s q u i t e rational f o r h i m t o a p p l y t h e available p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s selectively w i t h i n a framework o f d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d negotiation w i t h i n d u s t r y .
T h e Assessment o f Policy I n s t r u m e n t s by t h e Regulated I n d u s t r i e s
In a d d i t i o n t o t h e analyses mentioned above, we also made use o f a s t u d y by t w o D u t c h fiscal lawyers, Schuurman a n d Tegelaar (1983). T h i s s t u d y , based o n t h e s u b j e c t i v e assessments o f company officials d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d w i t h p o l l u t i o n abatement, was based o n 150 f i r m s c o n s t i t u t i n g
o n e -f i f t h of t h e c a t e g o r y " l a r g e polluters."
T h e d a t a were collected in i n t e r v i e w s w i t h one o r more f u n c t i o n a r i e s a t t h e s t a f f o r e x e c u t i v e level who were responsible f o r company p o l i c y w i t h r e g a r d t o water p o l l u t i o n o r who were closely i n v o l v e d in t h e implementation o f these policies.
In general, these o f f i c i a l s can b e considered t h e conversation p a r t n e r s o f t h e responde n t s from t h e p r e c e d i n g analysis o f t h e water b o a r d administrators.
T h e r e s u l t s o f t h i s s t u d y show c l e a r l y t h a t in t h e p e r i o d 1975-1980 e f f l u e n t charges h a d a s u b s t a n t i a l e f f e c t o n t h e abatement o f p o l l u t i o n by t h e companies i n v e s t i g a t e d .
F o r n e a r l y 60 p e r c e n t o f t h e companies i n t e rviewed, t h e c h a r g e l e v i e d was t h e decisive f a c t o r in t h e decision t o t a k e abatement measures.
T h e p o l l u t i o n decrease realized by these measures amounted t o more t h a n 3.2 million population equivalents o u t o f a total r e d u c t i o n o f p o l l u t i o n o f 4 million PEs.
T h i s means t h a t 80 p e r c e n t of p o l l u t i o n abatement realized in t h e p e r i o d 1975-1980 can, according t o t h e companies investigated, b e explained in terms o f t h e firms' response t o t h e e f f l u e n t charge, w i t h t h e remaining 20 p e r c e n t a t t r i b u t a b l e t o o t h e r fact o r s .
T h e most i m p o r t a n t noncharge i n s t r u m e n t mentioned a r e t h e d i sc h a r g e c o n d i t i o n s contained in t h e permits.
F o r more t h a n 20 p e r c e n t of t h e f i r m s s t u d i e d t h i s f a c t o r was g i v e n as t h e immediate reason f o r t a k i n g abatement measures.
T h e p o l l u t i o n decrease realized by these measures, however, amounted a t most t o 800,000 PEs.
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e company o f f i c i a l s interviewed, it is expected t h a t charges w i l l also b e a n i m p o r t a n t reason f o r t a k i n g f u r t h e r abatement measures.
In t h i s analysis, charges once again emerge as by f a r t h e most i n f l u e n t i a l i n s t r u m e n t , but somewhat less dominating w i t h r e g a r d t o organic wastewater p o l l u t i o n t h a n in t h e statistical analysis. T w o factors should, however, b e k e p t in mind when comparing these two analyses. F i r s t of al!, t h e r e seems to b e a c e r t a i n tendency in oral interviews t o g i v e t h e socially desirable answer t h a t something i s being done f o r environmental protection, n o t because it i s cheaper but because one has a social responsibility t o d o it, o r because t h e democratically elected authorities have asked f o r it. T h i s will lead t o a c e r t a i n underestimation o f t h e influence o f charges o n abatement actions.
Secondly, charges also can p l a y a n important role in cases where discharge regulations a r e t h e decisive motive f o r measures taken. Without charge, t h e difference between demands made by water boards a n d what i n d u s t r y deems economically feasible would have been much greater and, consequently, t h e resistance o f t h e f i r m s t o these demands much stronger.
CONCLUSION
Taken together these analyses lead t o t h e remarkable conclusion t h a t t h e substantial reduction o f pollution o f D u t c h i n d u s t r i a l wastewater between 1975 a n d 1980 has been much more t h e r e s u l t o f a policy instrument, effluent charges, t h a t was n o t officially designed f o r t h i s purpose, t h a n a r e s u l t o f t h e use o f t h e policy instrument, d i r e c t regulation, specifically intended t o achieve t h i s objective.
T h e D u t c h case, w i t h t h e most substantial system o f e f f l u e n t charges in the world, shows t h e enormous potential o f t h i s policy instrument.
In the research r e p o r t e d here, I did n o t come across a n y evidence t h a t would suggest t h a t t h i s r e s u l t can b e explained in terms o f specific national characteristics o f T h e Netherlands. T w o points, however, deserve attention.
T h e implementation o f e f f l u e n t charges can be hampered by t h e need f o r a devoted executive body t h a t i s determined t o actually collect the charges. Central government policies a r e o f t e n f r u s t r a t e d by lack o f cooperation by local authorities appointed t o implement them (Bressers E Honigh, 1986 ).
This problem did n o t arise in Holland, thanks t o the fact t h a t t h e i r e f f l u e n t charges function as so-called revenue r a i s i n g charges. T h r o u g h t h e charge system, t h e water authorities a r e collecting t h e i r own money, needed v e r y much f o r t h e building a n d exploitation of treatment plants, a task t h e y were eager t o undertake.
Another major problem w i t h e f f l u e n t charges i s t h e massive amount o f information t h a t i s r e q u i r e d t o assess t h e fee each company has t o pay.
Some a u t h o r s even see t h i s as t h e most important reason t o d i s c a r d t h i s policy instrument altogether.
In Holland, t h i s problem was reduced by n o t charging the millions o f households a n d small i n d u s t r i a l polluters (less t h a n 10 PE) in p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e actual pollution t h e y caused. H a v i n g relatively few opportunities o f limiting pollution, t h i s category o f polluters i s o f minor importance t o t h e instrument's r e g u l a t i n g power. T h e amount o f information r e q u i r e d i s again substantially reduced by basing t h e assessment o f medium-sized p o l l u t e r s (usually between 10 a n d 100 PE) n o t o n samples o f t h e i r effluent, but o n a coefficient table.
O n t h e basis o f easily obtainable data such as t h e amount o f water used by t h e f i r m o r t h e amount o f c e r t a i n raw materials it processes w i t h t h a t e x p e r t l y calculated coefficient table t h e probable amount o f pollution can b e established accurately.
However, t h e incentive t o reduce pollution remains intact.
Companies t h a t feel t h e y a r e overrated o n t h e coefficient table can request t h e i r e f f l u e n t t o b e sampled a n d t o b e charged o n t h e basis o f t h e results.
Not always t h i s leads t o permanent sampling.
Sometimes o n l y a n adjustment o f t h e relevant coefficient is made. All these pragmatic adjustments make it possible t o implement the charges a t t h e cost o f only a few percent o f t h e total revenue, without diminishing substantially t h e instrument's regulating power (as could b e shown).
Implementation problems being solvable and t h e way in which effluent charges influence t h e negotiation process being consistent w i t h what we would have been l e d t o expect by t h e economics literature, the greatest problem seems t o b e the feasibility o f i n t r o d u c i n g such charges.
In the words of Senator Domenici: "Charges have only one problem: they lack political support" (Domenici, 1982) . Perhaps t h e k e y question i s : Who's a f r a i d o f effective government? NOTES ' A population equivalent is the amount o f organic pollution equivalent t o the average organic pollution caused by one person in a normal household, which number o f PEs i s therefore equal t o t h e population.
For i n d u s t r i a l pollution the number o f PEs i s predominantly calculated on basis o f BOD a n d COD figures.
L T h e publication o f the s t u d y in 1983 had a substantial impact on the stance taken by t h e D u t c h environmentalists and led t o t h e proposal in parliament t o e x t e n d t h e coverage o f the charges.
Time, however, has been n o t o n t h e i r side due t o the most severe postwar economic c r i s i s Holland has experienced in recent years. 3Data o f low aggregation level were obtained from the task force for t h e preparation o f t h e "Indicative Multi-Year Program 1980 -1984 The fight against water pollution," M i n i s t r y o f Transport, Public Works and Wateraffairs, 1981 (in p a r t i c u l a r data o n pollution emissions) and from the D u t c h Central Statistical Office ( i n p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s o f the b r a n c h data a n d the data o n prices o f heavy metals).
4The following formula was used f o r t h i s calculation in the case o f organic pollution; in t h e case o f heavy metal pollution, a similar formula was used, expanded t o take t h e relative shares o f d i f f e r e n t metals into account. (1983, chap. 2) . Methodological problems, especially those in connection w i t h t h e operationalization o f t h e relevant theoretical notions t o a model o f
